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Preface 
The idea of doing a field study about micro savings was born in the spring of 2012. I reached 
the conclusion to focus on micro savings and the behavioral explanations to seemingly 
irrational behavior that the very poor display in their decision making about savings from 
talks with my tutor Yves Bourdet and from the books recommended by him.  
The book Poor Economics by Banerjee and Duflo was a stepping stone and gave me insight in 
the problems the poor face daily and without the institutional protection the rich are used to. 
The poor are vulnerable and savings is a way to protect oneself to a changing environment. 
But it is easier said than done. The obstacles the poor face in shape of time inconsistent 
preference or temptation goods are not unique for them. But they have less help to come 
around personal shortcomings and are more likely to fall into behavioral traps. In order to 
design efficient financial products for the poor, this understanding of the lives and decision 
making of the poor is vital.  
I had friends in Nepal since earlier trips and contacted them to make inquiries about contacts 
at the university and Micro Finance Institutions. I owe thanks to Raj Kumar Dhamala and 
Sadeep Dhungana who helped to get in contact with the Micro Finance Cooperative Chundevi 
Saccos and Niranjan Raut. I carried out my field study in cooperation with Chundevi Saccos 
and owe many thanks to all of their employees.  
I want to thank the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency for supporting 
me and my study by granting me the Minor Field Study grant. It would not have been equally 
successful without the help of Yves Bourdet and I thank him for his input and help.  
The process from the decision about the subject to the completion of the thesis was long but 
well worth every moment. The experience of conducting a field study alone and abroad taught 
me independence, innovation and flexibility. I made many new friends and learned about 
Nepalese culture and tradition. In every way, I feel happy and thankful about the experience. 
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Abstract 
It is more difficult for the poor to save money than for the wealthy. The poor have no 
institutions to help them such as state pensions and they are left to fight their personal short 
comings themselves. One consequence is that the poor save under their ability. Savings is 
important to respond to changes in the environment and to avoid incurring debt. Two of the 
behavioral obstacles the poor face in order to save are inconsistent time preferences in the 
form of hyperbolic time preferences and temptation goods. Such time preferences cause self-
control issues and procrastination of important decisions.  
By controlling for various socioeconomic variables such as schooling and age I targeted 
certain behavioral determinant of saving, notably hyperbolic time preferences and temptation 
goods, in my study. It turns out that the individuals with hyperbolic time preferences 
displayed signs of having problems of self-control in regards of temptation goods. Where 
financial instruments were not available the existence of inconsistent time preferences posed a 
large hindrance to saving in comparison to the area where formal saving was available. This 
confirms earlier research and stresses the importance of access to formal savings. 
 
Keywords: Micro Saving, Behavior, Hyperbolic Time Preference, Temptation, Risk Aversion  
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1. Introduction   
Micro savings enable the poor and very poor to save very small amounts of money at a time, 
amounts that no ordinary bank would accept because of the costs associated with running 
bank accounts for small sums. Having savings is important for everyone regardless of the size 
of disposable income but it is extra important for the poor as the returns to saving are 
especially large for them.  
But even as availability of formal savings products for the poor has increased the last years as 
micro finance has boomed, not all poor take advantage of the possibility. Because of different 
personal characteristics saving any considerable amounts may prove difficult. Inconsistent 
time preferences and temptation can contribute to problems of saving as well as previous 
experience and general outlook on life. Family size, education, age and many more factors 
play a role as an individual make her decision about saving or not, or how much to save.  
In many ways, the poor face more problems in order to save than the rich who for example 
have automated pension savings. For Micro Finance Institutes (MFI’s) understanding the 
individual’s decision process is essential to develop savings products that are suitable for the 
poor.  
In this study I map 286 individuals in Nepal divided into two samples, one urban and one 
rural, with the aim to track these personal traits and put them in correlation with 
socioeconomic data provided by the individuals and their decisions about savings. I cooperate 
with the micro finance cooperative Chundevi Saccos and their members as well as the 
villagers in rural Challing where no micro finance is available.  
Chapter two is a presentation of theory for the obstacles the poor face in the shape of time 
preferences, temptation and more. I also provide empirics and the results of previous studies. 
Chapter three is a description of my study and the data and in chapter five I use econometric 
analysis to treat the data. My conclusions and a discussion are presented in the sixth chapter.  
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2. Theoretical considerations and previous studies 
The poor live in environments of constant risk compared to the wealthy. They are exposed to 
the weather, to other people and to illness. The poor’s vulnerability is evident when they are 
hit by an adverse income chock and must take measures such as take the children out of 
school which in turn results in low accumulated human capital and creates a future poverty 
trap for the children (Jacoby and Skoufias 1992) or cut meals which the poor state makes 
them unhappy ( Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, s. 185). Conversely, a favorable income shock has 
positive effects. For instance, more resources can be spent on the young girls of the 
household, normally a neglected group, and increase their survival rate compared to boys 
(Rose, 1999). These examples demonstrate how imperfect credit markets have lots of 
spillover effects. A family with a buffer in form of savings is more likely to handle unforeseen 
situations and adverse income shocks without incurring debt or resorting to actions such as 
those described above. Yet not everyone have savings. In this chapter I provide theory and 
empirics to support the importance of savings and to understand the difficulties the poor face 
in order to save. 
 
2.1 Theory  
Saving is important to everyone who has a future and most people want to have savings in one 
form or another ( Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, s. 184). To have savings is a way for the individual 
to minimize risk, adapt consumption patterns according to income levels and changes and 
reduce unwanted expenses. 
If given enough time, any individual should be able to save themselves out of poverty 
(Morduch & Aghion, 2005, s. 148) and if only the credit markets were fully functioning, 
households would not be vulnerable to changes in income (Murdoch, 1995). But there is 
always the problem of personal behavior that comes in the way of the economic success of the 
poor. Some research has been carried out in the field of behavioral economics and psychology 
so as to understand why individuals make seemingly illogical decisions or fail to act in a 
rational way. Time preferences are often pointed out in the context of saving and can explain 
economic behavior that seems irrational at first glance, for example instances of temptation 
goods. 
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2.1.1 Time Preference 
To make decisions about the present and the future, we all use our time preferences. This 
means that we do not value events equally depending on what period of time they take place. 
Consistent time preferences entail a constant discount rate of future events whereas 
inconsistent time preferences mean that our discount rate of future utility varies differently in 
different time periods. Impatience is one way to describe time preference. An impatient 
person gets more utility from an immediate reward than a future one, even if the future reward 
is larger. The theory of discounted utility provides a way to understand people’s choices 
between utility now or later.  
To save is an intertemporal choice, which is an activity with consequences in several time 
periods, and for understanding that process economists use models of discounted utility. A 
model like this has two main components; the discount rate and the discount factor. The 
former values the rate of decline of the utility from the object and the later the actual value of 
a discounted object. Different models exist that suggest different ways of discounting. The 
most frequently used model of discounted utility is the exponential discount function with a 
constant discount rate inferring that the utility of an object declines with the same speed 
irrespective of when the consumer gain utility. Consequently the exponential discount 
function implies a dynamic consistency, entailing that individuals never change their minds 
about an investment (or decision to start saving) as time passes and as long as no new 
information arrives (Laibson, 2003).  
An alternative model that instead involves dynamic inconsistency uses mathematical 
hyperbolas to explain time preference. That construction allows preferences to switch as time 
goes by. Economists call this type of time preference hyperbolic time preference after the use 
of the hyperbolas or quasi-hyperbolas in the discount function (Laibson, 1997) (Harris & 
Laibson, 2001). In this model the discount rates decrease sharply for time periods in the future 
compared to the present. For an individual with hyperbolic time preference this means 
impatience in the present but patience for decisions about the future. One consequence is that 
important decisions are constantly procrastinated in the conflict between future and present 
selves, first pointed out by Strotz (1956) and can also be referred to as present-biased time 
preferences (Ainslie, 1992) (Chabris, Laibson, & Schuldt, 2008).  
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Individuals with inconsistent time preference difficulties can be categorized as sophisticated 
or naïve (Strotz, 1956). The sophisticated realize their problem and try to overcome it while 
the naïve ones fail to take action and thus fail to overcome their weaknesses. 
Hyperbolic time preferences give rise to several implications that are associated with 
problems to save money. One example is problems of self-control (Laibson, 2003). The 
traditional micro economic assumption is that people act rationally. But the poor do not seem 
very rational, in fact they spend money on unnecessary goods and they fail to make vital 
investments. Hyperbolic time preferences play a vital part in understanding this seemingly 
irrational behavior.  
 
2.1.2 Temptation Goods 
Temptation is something everyone can fall for, poor as well as rich. But for the poor spending 
on temptation goods, such as sweet tea, cigarettes, alcohol or chocolate, can have large 
consequences on the personal finances. These are goods that we want to consume in the 
moment, but we do not enjoy the utility from the product other than at the precise time of 
consumption. We can hope that our future selves do not spend money on the temptation good, 
but today we know that we will fall for temptation tomorrow again. The implication is a 
problem of self-control. Why put away savings today if a large part of it will go to goods that 
give me no pleasure looking forward to anyway? I may as well spend today. This behavior 
generates a so called temptation tax. Research shows that the poorer you are, the larger 
fraction of your money goes to temptations goods and the higher is the tax. So it is harder for 
the poor to be patient and to save instead of spend on unnecessary goods (Banerjee & 
Mullainathan, 2010). 
 
2.1.3 Risk 
For planning and looking ahead, an individual must be able to appreciate the implications of 
the future. By intuition, this is not easy for someone who may have trouble planning for next 
week’s food for the family. If an individual does not understand the costs and needs they will 
have in the future, the incentives to save are likely smaller. Becker and Mulligan (1997) put 
forth the theory that in order to be patient one has to invest in imagining the future. The future 
costs and for the poor it is not always affordable. Money goes into planning and preparing for 
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the future. Costs such as schooling, newspaper, or the cost of time to spend with aging parents 
can be too much for the poor and put a limit to a person’s farsightedness (Becker & Mulligan, 
1997). This approach is an attempt to endogenize hyperbolic time preference. In addition, 
more difficult decisions seem to be more expensive than easier ones. The more evident the 
difference between the expected utility of two possible choices is the less amount of time does 
the individual have to spend to make the choice. A choice which is more complicated takes 
more time, demands more resources and is more expensive  (Chabris, Morris, Taubinsky, 
Laibson, & Schuldt, 2009).  
Risk aversion also poses an impediment to the poor to escape poverty. Wealthier people are 
prepared to take more risk than the poor. Riskier activities yield higher returns but many poor 
cannot afford the risk. Thus they are stuck at investments, in agriculture for example, with 
low returns and fail to escape poverty as a consequence (Tomomi, Camerer, & Nguyen, 
2010). This is a poverty trap which could be escaped with higher savings. I will now move on 
to empirics and will return to the connection between risk aversion and poverty.  
 
2.2 Previous studies 
Savings from poor people may be very small one by one, but they make out a not negligible 
part of the gross domestic savings and should therefore not be ignored in the macroeconomic 
setting (Morduch & Aghion, 2005, s. 147). Even if the saved amount is small, it enables 
households to respond to changes in their environment without resorting to loans (Morduch & 
Aghion, 2005, s. 148). Theory and empirics show that the returns to saving are large for the 
poor which the recent boom in micro finance is proof of (Bauer, Chytilová, & Morduch, 
2012) (Dupas & Robinson, 2011). The benefits for the individual to save are convincing, but 
far from everyone saves or saves sufficiently. The most intuitive answer to why the poor do 
not save is that they obviously cannot because they have no money – they are poor! But as it 
turns out, even the extremely poor save or want to save ( Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, s. 186). 
Hyperbolic time preference, impatience, temptation tax and risk aversion all pose problems 
for the poor. 
2.2.1 Time Preferences 
Empirics show no support for the exponential discount model. Instead, the model which use 
hyperbolas (Laibson, 1997) have support from empirics (Frederick, Loewenstien, & 
O'Donoghue, 2002) (Chabris, Laibson, & Schuldt, 2008). The brain mechanism that causes 
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hyperbolic time preferences stems from two different systems in the human brain, the “hot” 
and the “cool” system. The cool system is more logical and rational and the hot system more 
impulsive and want immediate rewards. They fight each other for decisions in the present and 
the hot system often wins; however, the cool system wins over the hot one for decisions about 
the future (Albrecht, Volz, Sutter, Laibson, & von Cramon, 2010)
1
. This type of present-bias 
is present regardless of the level of wealth (Tomomi, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010). Some 
studies find that the percentage of hyperbolic individuals in a population is as high as a third 
(Bauer, Chytilová, & Morduch, 2012).  
This results in that the poor with hyperbolic preferences choose to take loans and pay high 
interest rates instead of saving, which makes their financial choices very expensive (Morduch 
& Aghion, 2005).  For example, it can be easier for someone with hyperbolic preferences to 
repay a loan than to save up any significant sum of money (Basu, 2008). In that case, the 
interest rate of the loan is the cost of not being able to save  (Karlan, Yin, & Ashraf, 2006). 
Further examples of cases when hyperbolic time preference causes troubles are in those of 
fertilizers (Duflo, Kremer, & Robinson, 2011) and of school attendance (Mullainathan, 2005). 
People often know that these are good investments but in the present it is too hard to commit 
to them and so the decisions are pushed to a future self who looks stronger and more patient 
from the view of the present.  
When households use a savings account regularly, they save more and spend less on 
unnecessary and unwanted goods or services than without similar services (Dupas & 
Robinson, 2011). Saving at home is difficult. Money lying around the house tends to go to 
unplanned expenses, such as relatives coming over to eat or temptations such as cigarettes and 
alcohol ( Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, s. 192). If the money is stored in a savings account 
households can avoid this scattering of money. Instead they can save up to larger sums and 
invest in what gives the highest return in the longer run, like preventative medicine, nutritious 
food or schooling ( Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, s. 193). If poor families spent more on 
preventive medical care (such as anti-malaria mosquito nets) or escaped malnutrition, they 
could avoid falling ill, a catastrophe that can ruin a family’s economy and encumber them 
with debt (SVT, 2012-09-06).  
                                                          
1
 This type of research is common within the field of neuroeconomics and border to behavioral economics. I will 
not go deeper into this but brain functions like these are essential to comprehending the human decision making 
process. 
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Earlier research suggests that hyperbolic preferences are linked to difficulties to save and also 
to higher likeliness to use commitment-savings products if the individual is sophisticated 
(Strotz, 1956). The sophisticated individuals find ways to “lock themselves” to a difficult 
decision while the naïve fail to undertake any measures and get into trouble (Strotz, 1956)  
(Akerlof, 1991) (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 2001). One way to do this is with a commitment 
savings product that requires the saver to make certain deposits at certain intervals. Research 
that lets men and women with hyperbolic preferences open a commitment savings account 
show that the women were more likely to take the offer when men were too but not 
significantly. Women in the Philippines with low discount rates were for example more 
inclined to open a commitment savings account (Karlan, Yin, & Ashraf, 2006) and research 
find that hyperbolic women keep less savings at home, are more likely to take loans and more 
likely to join MFI’s (Bauer, Chytilová, & Morduch, 2012). For the men, hyperbolism did not 
play a part with regards to saving but for women they did (Bauer, Chytilová, & Morduch, 
2012). 
 
2.2.2 Temptation Goods 
Hyperbolic preferences can lead to more problems for the poor other than to start saving. For 
many poor who rely on micro loans to run their business and fail to get out of their debt, or 
feel powerless faced to the temptation they always seem to fall for, hyperbolic time 
preferences can explain the impatience that give rise to their difficulties. One example of this 
impatience is demonstrated by economists Banerjee and Duflo in their book Poor Economics. 
Some women in Bangladesh take daily loans at the interest rate 4,7 percent per day to keep 
their business running. Whilst paying this extreme interest, they consume several cups of tea 
every day. If the women only cut back on their expenses for tea and invested in their business 
instead, they could be debt free after three months! But they decided to keep drinking their tea 
and took daily loans. ( Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, s. 190)
 
 This is of course irrational at a first 
glance and if the poor have to rely on loans to keep their daily lives going, as the women in 
Bangladesh, they have little opportunity to see an increase of their income and thus the 
possibility to expand their savings. 
Wealthier people do seem to be more patient than poor and a higher mean income in one’s 
surroundings is also related to more patience (Tomomi, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010) but 
research is not unanimous and some studies find no correlation between income and patience 
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(Kirby, o.a., 2002) Men and women have in common that the more patient they are, the more 
they save. Patience also increases with age (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994). Women seem to 
be more patient than men (Hamoudi & Thomas, 2006) but the effect of education on patience 
is strong, especially for men, for women the effect if similar although weaker  (Bauer, 
Chytilová, & Morduch, 2012).  
It is harder to manage savings on a life time perspective compared to a season-to-season 
perspective. As theory predicts, decision making about future investments is a time 
consuming and costly exercise (Chabris, Morris, Taubinsky, Laibson, & Schuldt, 2009). 
 
2.2.3 Risk  
Correlation between risk aversion and personal characteristics is not always conclusive. Since 
the early research of Binswanger (1980), many other field experiments and collections of data 
has been undertaken. Gender had no specific effect on risk aversion but those who were older 
and more educated were more risk averse while income had no effect. The mean village 
income however had a correlation with loss aversion (Tomomi, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010). 
Other research show that men are less adverse to financial risk than women but that research 
often fail to control for differences between the sexes such as education, wealth and status 
within the household (Eckel & Grossman, 2008) and (Wik, Tewodros, Bergland, & Holden, 
2004). The later study found no correlation between age and risk aversion.  
Risk, uncertainty and vulnerability due to income fluctuations are part of the definition of 
being poor and they are in themselves a negative spiral. If the poor could minimize their 
exposure to risk they could make more profitable investments (Kanbur & Squire, 2001). The 
riskier investments generate higher returns, but these are often restricted to wealthier families 
(Rosenzweig & Binswanger, 1993). But results for wealth and risk aversion are not entirely 
clear and sometimes positive correlation between risk and wealth could be found (Nielsen, 
2001), sometimes negative (that is increased wealth is correlated with decreased risk aversion) 
(Wik, Tewodros, Bergland, & Holden, 2004) (Mahmud, 2004) and sometimes none at all 
(Mosley & Verschoor, 2005) and (Binswanger, 1980).  
Family size can be both positively and negatively correlated with risk aversion, depending on 
whether the family size is a sign of wealth or not. For poor families, a large family can mean 
more wealth and less risk aversion as more people can work (Dillon & Scandizzo, 1978) but it 
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can also mean more mouths to feed and thus more risk aversion (Feinerman & Finkelshtain, 
1996).  
Expectations 
 
                  
Surya Vinayak 
More savings, because of 
access to savings products 
More patient than Challing due to higher mean 
income in the area.       
Challig Less savings because of low access to savings products            
Women When hyperbolic preferences are present, less 
savings for naïve and more for sophisticated 
individuals More patient than men.        
Men Hyperbolism plays a smaller part when it comes to saving than for women        
Patience 
More savings. The older should be more patient. 
Higher education and more 
risk averse       
Hyperbolic Little or much savings depending on level of sophistication and access to comittment savings 
products. High costs for temptation goods.  
Risk aversion Unclear relation to wealth and family size               
  
3. Method and Data 
In this study I intend to see how inconsistent time preferences, risk aversion and temptation 
tax affect the individuals wealth and savings. I further investigate possible endogenous 
explanations to the personal characteristics. This study is a contribution of field evidence to 
the literature of behavioral foundations of personal finances of the poor. 
3.1 The survey 
The participants in the study come from the urban and suburban area Surya Vinayak, a part of 
the city Bhaktapur and from Challing, a village five kilometers from the same town. The 
inhabitants of the two areas differ from each other in aspects of for example education, 
income, and experience of micro finance, including savings. The two samples allow me to 
observe how the surroundings affect choices about saving and track systematic differences for 
urban and rural environments. In the following sections I provide a full description of the 
samples.   
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Firstly I designed the survey according to the personal and socioeconomic aspects as well as 
the personal preferences that were of interest to me. The translation from English to Nepalese 
was made by two employees at the Saccos office. I reviewed the translation with a friend who 
studies at the university and speaks very well English to ensure that the translation did not 
differ from the original version.  
Socioeconomic information 
The questions concerning socioeconomic information and observable economic behavior 
were straight forward. To capture personal preferences I used hypothetical situations or 
proxies.  
The alternatives for age were divided into categories such as 0-19, 20-30 etc. The same 
method with categories was employed for education, income and savings. When analyzing the 
data, I use the value of the full category divided by two, which is the value in the middle of 
the category. I have chosen to do this because I have no reason to believe that the data should 
be distributed according to a certain distribution, t-distribution for example, within the 
category and it is a convenient way to analyze the bulk of data. The average value is 
calculated with this formula:  
(             )  (            )
 
              
For handling savings as part of income, I have excluded the values over one that infers that 
the individual saves more than his income every month. I have kept all values close to one but 
smaller although they are unrealistic. The surveys have probably been misunderstood or the 
individuals have tried to impress by exaggerating the numbers.  
Personal Preferences 
The personal preferences I targeted were time preferences, risk behavior, the importance of 
saving for the individual and expectations for the future. I also asked about trust for their 
income to arrive in time as a proxy for their security in their life situation. I use dummies for 
all these variables.  
In a typical discount rate study, the study has to satisfy three assumptions. First, the rewards 
offered to the subjects are assumed to be consumed directly and secondly the utility function 
must be linear in consumption which means that the utility from a reward changes linear with 
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the size of the reward. The third assumption is that subjects must trust in the rewards to be 
paid as promised (Laibson, 2003). This is the one I breach as no rewards were actually paid. 
But there is no “gold standard” for measuring discount functions (Chabris, Laibson, & 
Schuldt, 2008). More complicated models are often used for measuring discount rates with as 
many as 75 questions and were money is handed out to all participants (Tomomi, Camerer, & 
Nguyen, 2010). I do not use some of the more sophisticated methods of measuring time 
preferences because I do not have the competence to employ it not the resources as in the case 
of Bauer et al (2012) who used ten trained research assistants to help carry out the 
experiments and actual payments were made. Therefore I have one variable for different types 
of time preference and one for risk aversion and since I am not interested in measuring the 
exact discount rates but only the existence or non-existence of hyperbolic preferences I 
believe my model is sufficient. 
I had two questions that aimed at capturing time preferences, and especially hyperbolic 
preferences. The first one was “If you could choose one of the following, which one would 
you chose? 1.1000 rupees tomorrow. 2. 2000 rupees in a month” and the second was “If you 
could choose one of the following, which one would you chose? 1. 1000 rupees in a year. 2. 
2000 rupees in a year and one month”. The aim was to find out how impatient the individual 
was at different points of time. An answer like 1 and 1 shows impatience no matter the time 
and similarly, 2 and 2 indicate patience at both times. If the individual would answer 1 and 2 
that suggests hyperbolic preferences, that is impatience now but patience for a decision about 
the future. For hyperbolic preferences I invented a new dummy variable to handle the 
different scenarios. Answer 1, 1 or 2, 2 signifies no hyperbolic preferences and is symbolized 
by a value of 0. Answer 1, 2 correspond to value 1 and indicate hyperbolism. To measure 
patience and impatience, I use the dummy 0 for impatience and 1 for patience. 
To capture risk preferences, I employed a simulation of different lotteries. The participant 
chose between different lotteries with different outcomes that suggested different level of risk. 
By choosing which lottery the participant would want to be in they also revealed their level of 
risk aversion. This lottery was not conducted in real life and that might mean that the results 
are slightly biased towards more risk taking and less risk adverse. Because the situation was 
not real, there was little reason for the participants to not take any risks. Nevertheless many 
chose a “lottery” with less risk than other alternatives which indicates that result is relevant 
but must be handled with care. The dummy is 0 for risk aversion and 1 for risk takers. A more 
complicated model could have included lotteries that also had risks of losses, or monotonic 
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switching (Tomomi, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010), but I chose a simpler model to get 
indications of the subject risk preferences rather than with the aim to value a loss aversion 
parameter. 
I included questions about spending; what the participants spent on and what they would like 
to cut back on. From ranking their expenses and which ones they would like to decrease I 
could gain some understanding for their relation to temptation goods and how that was 
correlated to the existence of hyperbolic time preferences. 
 
3.1.1 Distribution 
The surveys were distributed by the employees of micro finance cooperative Chundevi Saccos 
and by me. The distribution differed depending on the participant and on which sample group 
the participant belonged to. For uptake group 1, which was the members of Chundevi Saccos, 
all distribution happened either at the office or through the marketers of the Saccos. The 
marketers visit their clients daily or weekly according to their mutual agreement and they 
carried the surveys with them.  The marketers can be responsible for more than 200 members. 
I sent out surveys with the marketers and they collected them at their next appointment with 
the member. 
The members who did not work with a marketer but visited the office to make deposits or 
loan payments had the choice to fill out a survey in the office. Most members who visited the 
office filled out a survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For uptake group 2, the surveys were distributed by me and one employee from Chundevi Saccos 
who accompanied me to the village Challing. There we went from house to house and asked if they 
wanted to participate. In is not an random walk method in either cases but I still judge the samples 
to be representative of the members of Chundevi Saccos and of Challing.  
168 surveys were filled in Surya Vinayak and 126 surveys were conducted in Challing. A 
number of surveys were incomplete due to unwillingness to share certain information or 
simply by misunderstanding the instructions to answer every question. This causes the sample 
size to vary depending on which variables I investigate. The missing answers are of stochastic 
nature and therefore I have no reason to entirely exclude the surveys that were not completely 
filled out.  
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3.2 Uptake Areas 
3.2.1 Surya Vinayak and Chundevi Saccos 
Surya Vinayak is an area by the edge of the town Bhaktapur and one hour away from the 
capital Kathmandu. It is a bustling urban area as well as more suburban with fields of 
different crops that stretch between the multistory buildings. The two parts are on different 
sides of a large high way. 
I had access to the inhabitants of Surya Vinayak through the cooperative Chundevi Saccos 
(Saccos stands for Savings and Credit Cooperative). Chundevi Saccos have about 700 
members, all of whom keep savings and many have loans. The members of Chundevi live on 
both sides of the highway and represent a mixture of urban and suburban people. I restricted 
my survey to the members of the Saccos because it facilitated the administration to reach a 
large number of people. Obviously this sample does not represent the inhabitants of Surya 
Vinayak but rather a group of people who all keep savings and have taken action to join the 
micro finance cooperative.  
3.2.2 Challing 
Challing is a village on the hillside, five kilometers from the town Bhaktapur and 
approximately seven kilometers from Surya Vinayak. In this village, farming is the main 
source of income but some people are employed in town. Electricity is available in many 
homes but not all. Most families get water from village springs. The children generally read 
and write but for older generations illiteracy is wide spread. No financial institutions of any 
kind are present in Challing. As comparison, in Surya Vinayak more than four Saccos operate, 
but the inhabitants of Challing have until recently not had access to financial products. One 
Saccos is slowly starting in the area now but very few I talked to had heard of it. 
3.3 Complications 
Honesty of the participants was of course essential to gain truthful answers to the survey 
questions. Before the distribution started, I held meetings with the marketers and the 
employees at the Saccos office and gave instructions where I emphasized the importance of 
honesty when the participants filled out the surveys.  
To avoid the situation where the participants fill out the survey in the presence of any official 
or person that may affect their answers, I followed the strategy of distributing the surveys in 
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envelopes. The participant could return the survey in a closed envelope. By putting a small 
physical hinder to opening the survey, in the form of the closed envelope, I hope the 
participants trust the information to be confidential. By letting the participants being 
anonymous I hoped they would feel comfortable to be honest about submitting personal 
information.  
This strategy is only successful as long as the participant is literate. The level of literacy was 
low and this made confidentiality difficult to uphold. Because of the widespread illiteracy, the 
survey’s questions and answers had to be read out loud by an employee of Chundevi Saccos 
and thus the problem arise of the participants being influenced by a marketer’s presence and  
their honesty diverted. There is also the possibility that the employees subconsciously affect 
the answers of the participants. In Challing, the level of illiteracy was considerably higher 
than in Surya Vinayak. Almost all surveys had to be translated orally.  
When discussing the issues with the marketers at Chundevi Saccos, they showed little 
understanding for why the answers could be dishonest. According to my coworkers there is 
not a big culture of lying or being dishonest in Nepal, but I cannot exclude the possibility of 
some answers being polished when the participant filled out the form in the presence of an 
official. 
The different ways of distribution are separated so that I can track systematic differences as 
well as they are separated depending on which marketer distributed the surveys. However, I 
had no possibility to know which surveys were actually filled out with the help of a marketer 
or which ones the participant filled without help. 
Chart 1     Representation of distribution at Chundevi Saccos  
 
  Office Indira Tulsi Niru 
Total 12 17 34 105 
Mean personal inome 9271 16458 15147 13403 
Age (mean) 38 33 33 30 
Education (mean) 7 6 7 7 
Number of hyperbolic 5  11 13 12 
Average savings 4256 1027 5508 2958 
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 3.4 Description of data  
In Challing the income is 63 percent of the average income in Surya Vinayak and the same 
difference is present between men and women. On average the participants from Surya 
Vinayak have 2 years more in school than those in Challing. The women in Challing have the 
fewest years of schooling while men in Surya Vinayak have twice as many. But the numbers 
of years spent in school actually tells me nothing about the general level of education. 
Average levels of savings differ hugely between the participants from Surya Vinayak and 
Challing, also in relation to income. Once again, the women in Challing come up short with 
smallest savings, only a tenth of that of men but it is the men from Challing that save the 
smallest fraction of their income.  
 
Chart 3 
Descriptive statistics 
       
  
Challing Chundevi Men Women 
Men 
Challing 
Men 
Chundevi 
Women 
Challing 
Women 
Chundevi Total 
Total number of subjects 126 160 138 68 65 73 61 87 286 
Mean personal inome 5061 8074 9283 9627 7460 10856 2500 5712 6766 
Mean household income 11610 14269 16495 19646 14404 18356 8583 10799 13099 
Mean income /person and 
day 74 94 112 126 98 124 50 68 85 
Age (mean)   35 32 34 34 36 32 35 31 33 
Education (mean) 5 7 7 6 7 8 4 6 6 
Average family size 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 6 
Average savings 507 2381 1929 1817 663 3279 341 1650 1487 
 
Chart 2 
Responses to hypothetical time preference questions   
  
Reward in a year or 13 months 
 
  
Patience Impatience Total 
Reward now  Patience 54 14 68 
or in one month 
 
19% 5% 
 
 
Impatience 71 140 211 
  
25% 50% 
 
 
Total 125 154 279 
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Chart four to six describe the distributions of hyperbolic, patient and impatient individuals. 
The individuals with hyperbolic time preferences are evenly distributed over sex and sample 
and constitute about a fourth of the entire population. They have generally income and 
savings above average for their subsample. They also have about the same amount of years of 
schooling as their comparable groups with the exception of hyperbolic women who had spent 
notably fewer years in school than other women. Especially the hyperbolic women from 
Challing who went to school about half the amount of years as the average of all women in 
Challing. The individuals with hyperbolic time preferences all have in common that they 
value the importance of savings slightly less than the average.  
About a fifth demonstrated patience in both the present and one year ahead but the 
distribution of the women differ as one third of the women in Challing are patient and only a 
tenth of the women in Surya Vinayak. These groups of women are similar to each other in 
almost every aspect that I’ve measured apart from education where the patient Challing 
women have less the half the average amount of years in school then the sample average and 
the patient Surya Vinayak women have just above their average. At the same time they are 
patient to a higher degree which is usually related to more education. The women also differ 
on the account of income.  
Patient women in Challing have 0,6 the average income of their sample and patient women in 
Surya Vinayak have 1,4 times their average income. In Challing the patient individuals are 
also often risk takers while they are not in Surya Vinayak. But there they tend to worry about 
their income to a high degree. The patient men distinguished themselves by having 1,5 times 
the average savings for men. Patient women show the opposite behavior with less than half 
the average savings for women. Generally, the patient individuals have education and income 
above average, with the exception of women from Challing who are low under their average.  
About half the entire sample showed impatience at both moments of time. The impatient also 
state that they worry about their income to the same degree as the patient do. The impatient in 
Challing are often also risk takers while the opposite is true about the impatient in Surya 
Vinayak. The impatient give a smaller weight to the importance of savings than the average 
but they have savings on the same level as the average. However there are big differences 
between the subsamples.   
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Chart 5 Distribution of Patient Individuals          
 
All Men Women Challing Surya Vinayak 
Women 
Challing 
Women Surya 
Vinayak 
Men 
Challing 
Men Surya 
Vinayak 
Number of 
individuals 
55 28 27 36 19 20 8 16 11 
 
19% 20% 18% 29% 12% 33% 9% 25% 15% 
Worry 43 19 24 30 13 17 7 13 6 
  80% 70% 86% 83% 68% 85% 88% 81% 55% 
Risk taking 28 14 14 26 2 13 1 13 1 
  51% 52% 50% 72% 11% 65% 13% 81% 9% 
Considered 
importance* 
1,25 1,33 1,15 1,32 1,11 1,22 1,00 1,44 1,18 
  1,00 1,05 0,94 1,00 0,93 0,96 0,84 1,05 1,00 
Mean savings 1638,8 2906,5 517,3 330,6 5261,5 152,5 1733,3 553,1 8285,7 
  1,10 1,51 0,48 0,65 2,21 0,45 1,04 0,83 2,53 
Mean education 7,0 7,8 6,2 6,3 8,3 6,0 6,7 6,6 9,5 
  1,11 1,04 1,19 1,18 1,18 1,52 1,10 1,00 1,16 
Mean age 32,9 34,2 31,6 33,4 32,0 31,8 31,1 35,3 32,5 
  0,99 1,01 0,96 0,94 1,01 0,92 0,99 0,99 1,01 
Mean income 6795,5 10277,8 3437,5 5416,7 9407,9 1500,0 8281,3 10312,5 10227,3 
  1,00 1,11 0,78 1,07 1,17 0,60 1,45 1,38 0,94 
Mean family size 6,1 6,5 5,7 6,2 5,8 5,7 5,8 6,9 5,9 
  1,09 1,16 1,03 1,10 1,06 1,00 1,06 1,22 0,72 
Chart 4 Distribution of hyperbolic time preference         
 
All Men Women Challing Surya Vinayak 
Women 
Challing 
Women Surya 
Vinayak 
Men 
Challing 
Men Surya 
Vinayak 
Number of 
individuals 68 36 32 30 38 12 20 18 18 
  24% 26% 22% 24% 24% 20% 23% 28% 25% 
Worry 25 14 11 8 17 2 9 6 8 
  37% 39% 34% 27% 45% 17% 45% 33% 44% 
Risk taking 31 15 16 25 7 12 4 13 2 
  46% 42% 50% 83% 18% 100% 20% 72% 11% 
Considered 
importance* 1,34 1,29 1,40 1,41 1,30 1,40 1,40 1,41 1,18 
  1,08 1,02 1,14 1,06 1,09 1,10 1,17 1,03 1,00 
Mean savings 1817,2 2129,0 1459,3 633,3 3085,7 533,3 2200,0 700,0 4107,7 
  1,22 1,10 1,35 1,25 1,30 1,56 1,32 1,06 1,25 
Mean education 6,3 8,4 3,9 5,2 7,2 1,9 5,2 7,3 9,5 
  1,00 1,12 0,76 0,97 1,02 0,49 0,85 1,11 1,15 
Mean age 33,7 31,6 36,0 34,7 32,8 35,3 36,5 34,4 28,8 
  1,01 0,93 1,10 0,98 1,03 1,01 1,16 0,96 0,90 
Mean income 9626,9 13854,2 4717,7 5333,3 13108,1 3020,8 5789,5 7265,6 20833,3 
  1,42 1,49 1,07 1,05 1,62 1,21 1,01 0,97 1,92 
Mean family size 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,8 5,6 6,2 5,4 5,6 5,8 
  1,02 1,02 1,02 1,03 1,01 1,08 0,99 1,00 0,70 
Charts 4-6 are read as follows: 36 men show hyperbolic time preferences and correspond to 26 % of all men. 14 men who are 
hyperbolic also worry and out of all hyperbolic men that is 39 %. For example: out of the hyperbolic women in Challing, all are 
risktakers. Among the hyperbolic, mean income is 9627 which is 1,4228 times the mean income for the whole sample, etc. 
*Importance is measure 1-4 with 1 corresponding to "Very Important" and 4 "Not Important". This means that 1,0789 times the 
average entails a lowered considered importance of savings among the hyperbolic. 
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Impatient women in Challing save 1,6 times the average savings for women in Challing while 
impatient men in Surya Vinayak only save 0,65 that of their average. The income of the 
impatient was a little below average and women of Challing and men of Surya Vinayak 
distinguish themselves again with 1,6 and 0,6 respectively of their averages. 
In Challing a majority wants to cut down on their expenses and the cost most of them would 
like to cut back on was clothes and food. This can be read from chart 7. Clothes and food does 
not necessarily mean temptation goods. In Surya Vinayak, the expense the most wanted to cut 
back on was festival and celebrations. The survey was carried out after the year’s two largest 
festivals so the result may be biased towards those costs.  
Festivals cannot be considered temptation goods as they are often looked forward to and 
planned for a long time in advance. Temptation on the other hand is something one falls for 
often, if not daily.  
Out of all who wants to cut back, 44 percent showed hyperbolic time preferences compared to 
the whole sample where 24 percent were hyperbolic. Nothing conclusive can be said about 
Chart 6 Distribution of Impatient Individuals           
 
All Men Women Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak 
Women 
Challing 
Women Surya 
Vinayak 
Men 
Challing 
Men Surya 
Vinayak 
Number of 
individuals 
136 66 70 45 91 19 51 26 40 
 
48% 48% 47% 36% 57% 31% 59% 40% 55% 
Worry 99 46 53 27 72 14 39 13 33 
 
73% 70% 76% 60% 79% 74% 76% 50% 83% 
Risk taking 52 24 28 37 15 16 12 21 3 
  38% 36% 40% 82% 16% 84% 24% 81% 8% 
Considered 
importance* 
1,16 1,18 1,13 1,23 1,12 1,17 1,12 1,28 1,13 
  0,93 0,93 0,92 0,93 0,94 0,92 0,93 0,93 0,95 
Mean savings 1363 1525 1205 611 1743 579 1445 634 2112 
  0,92 0,79 1,11 1,20 0,73 1,70 0,86 0,96 0,64 
Mean education 6,14 6,58 5,72 4,91 6,74 4,05 6,34 5,54 7,25 
  0,98 0,88 1,10 0,92 0,96 1,03 1,05 0,84 0,88 
Mean age 33 35 31 38 31 37 29 38 33 
  1,00 1,04 0,96 1,07 0,97 1,07 0,93 1,06 1,03 
Mean income 5611 6816 4493 5506 5659 3889 4706 6719 6875 
  0,83 0,73 1,02 1,09 0,70 1,56 0,82 0,90 0,63 
Mean family size 5,28 5,21 5,34 5,29 5,27 5,63 5,24 5,04 5,33 
  0,95 0,93 0,96 0,93 0,96 0,98 0,96 0,90 0,65 
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that group whose costs to cut are similar to the entire sample. But the fact that the hyperbolic 
were overrepresented in the sample tells me a lot. The hyperbolic should be more prone to fall 
for temptation and they do seem to have a larger problem holding on to their money than the 
average.  
Chart 7                           Expenses and temptation  
      
   
Yes: No: 
Percentage that 
want to cut back 
      Would like to cut back 
on your expenses? 
Surya 
Vinayak  69 89 44% 
        
  Challing 87 39 69%   
     What on? 
           
  
Festival 
/celebration Medical Education Vacation Vehicles 
Business  
investment 
Housing 
contruction 
House-
hold 
Clothes 
/food Other 
Surya Vinayak 22% 0% 13% 35% 7% 0% 0% 7% 13% 4% 
Challing   15% 10% 24% 3% 1% 2% 17% 0% 29% 1% 
Men Surya Vinayak 23% 0% 0% 59% 0% 0% 0% 5% 9% 5% 
Men Challing 65% 5% 3% 18% 0% 0% 8% 0% 3% 0% 
Women Surya 
Vinayak 24% 3% 21% 10% 10% 0% 3% 7% 14% 7% 
Women Challing 69% 9% 3% 3% 0% 0% 9% 0% 6% 3% 
Hyperbolic   35% 3% 13% 10% 10% 0% 10% 0% 13% 6% 
 
4. Econometrics, results and analysis  
In this chapter about the econometric analysis of the data I first present my hypothesis. Then I 
look at the personal traits, current socioeconomic situation and personal characteristics and 
their respective relationship with savings using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Third I make a 
binary analysis to try to endogenize time preference. Lastly, I make a sensitivity analysis by 
dividing the data into subgroups depending on sex and age to see if the results from the OLS 
are robust and to track differences for different groups.  
4.1 Hypothesis 
The hyperbolic of Chundevi Saccos have higher savings than the hyperbolic in Challing. 
Hyperbolic preferences affect the savings decisions of women more positively than those of 
men. 
The patient individuals have more savings and they are older as well as more educated. The 
hyperbolic have higher costs for temptation goods.   
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I intend to answer my hypothesis and gain further understanding about the participants by 
mapping their savings decisions made and finding their common denominators with regard to 
personal traits, socioeconomic basis and personal preferences. 
4.2 OLS-regressions 
I start with a set of regressions for linear numerical relationships between my depending and 
explaining variables in the model Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The depending variables are 
savings in absolute numbers and savings as a part of income. Through the OLS-estimations I 
intend to examine how the dependent variable varies when I add on the groups in the model. 
More specifically, the groups are personal traits (sex, age and education), socioeconomic traits 
(income, family size, savings experience) and preferences (hyperbolism, risk aversion, 
considered importance of savings, optimism, worry). This is the standard model
5
:  
                  ( )         
I cannot exclude possible heteroscedasticity and I conduct White’s test for all regressions. 
When I detect heteroscedasticity at five percent significance I perform White’s 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent Standard Errors on those regressions. 
One problem that I must be aware of is multicolinearity, which is linearity among the X-
variables. Tables over correlation for all variables and over different samples are presented in 
the appendix. I accept correlation up to 0.8.  
The men had higher savings in the range of 600 rupees per month over the whole sample but 
the difference between men and women was over 1000 rupees in Surya Vinayak than in 
Challing. For savings as a proportion of income, the result was not as clear and I found no 
significant differences between the sexes.  
Age gave no conclusive results. In Surya Vinayak the older saved more and in Challing, it 
was opposite. But age, as education, income and savings, was determined by an interval 
which made the estimates unclear and not decisive. The effect of education on savings was 
not clear. In regressions including only group one education had a positive correlation with 
savings. But when I expanded the regressions the effect of education diminished or became 
negative. 
                                                          
5
 Tables over my OLS-regressions are presented in the appendix. 
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A raised income contribute positive but slight to savings and had a negative effect for savings 
as part of income. Experience from saving has very positive effect on savings and those who 
had experience from saving also saved a larger proportion of their income. The family size 
had different impacts on savings in Challing and Surya Vinayak respectively. For inhabitants 
of Challing, an extra family member meant smaller savings and the opposite as true for the 
members of Chundevi Saccos in Surya Vinayak. 
Hyperbolic preferences seem to have a negative effect on savings for the rural area and for the 
urban area it was positive. This is in line with my hypothesis and can be contributed to the 
fact that the individuals in Surya Vinayak are members of Chundevi Saccos and thus have 
taken steps to overcome their time preference problem. The people in Challing do not have 
that possibility which makes hyperbolic time preferences a disadvantage for them.  
Risk takers saved considerably less per month (1617 rupees less per month) than risk adverse. 
Also considering savings as a proportion of income, risk takers saved less. There was no 
difference to be found between rural and urban areas when it came to risk taking but it was 
notably over the whole sample that the correlation emerged. 
The considered importance of savings did not show a significant impact on savings in 
absolute numbers. For savings as a proportion of income on the other hand, the result is 
positive. The less important an individual considers savings, the smaller proportion of their 
income do they also save.  
Worrying about losing ones’ income turned out to have a negative effect on saving both in 
absolute numbers and in proportion to income. This effect was especially large and significant 
in the rural village Challing. For the entire sample, worrying was negative for savings as 
proportion of income at five percent significance. 
Family size answered to savings similar to what empirics suggest. The effect of a large family 
was negative in Challing but positive in Surya Vinayak. This can mean that in Surya Vinayak 
a large family was positive as more people could contribute to the wealth of the family while 
in Challing, a large family means more mouths to feed as less money to put away as savings. 
4.3 Determinants of time preference 
By employing a binary choice model on the time preferences, I see how much the variables I 
measured contributed to determining whether or not an individual displayed the characteristic. 
26 
The model I use is a binary probit model (Quadratic hill climbing) and I alternated the 
determining variables according to same model as I used for the OLS-estimations to find 
statistically significant patterns.  
I did not pay out any rewards for the hypothetical questions concerning time preference. It is 
difficult to estimate how that would have affected my results, but most likely the effect was a 
bias towards patience. If the individual knew now money would be paid anyway, then why 
state impatient preferences? It is easier to be smart when there are no actual stakes on the 
table. I have to take this into consideration as I value my results.  
Education had a small positive and significant effect on the likeliness to be patient in Surya 
Vinayak while education had no specific effect on the likeliness for a person to have 
hyperbolic preferences. This can mean that educated are more likely to have consistent time 
preferences but can also in part be an endogenous effect as more education increases income 
which contributes positively to the patience of people. People with larger families were more 
likely to be patient. Age had no conclusive effect on people’s patience but did contribute 
positively to the likelihood of someone having hyperbolic preferences in Surya Vinayak and 
the opposite was the case for people in Challing.   
The effects from wealth on both hyperbolic time preferences and patience were small but 
income in measured in units of one rupee so the effects can in fact be rather large. In Challing, 
income had no effect but in the other cases does it make a positive contribution. The question 
of causality is not answered by my charts however. 
People with experience of saving were more inclined to be hyperbolic in both samples. People 
who considered savings important had a strong negative relationship with the probability to be 
hyperbolic. The negative correlation was present in both Challing and Surya Vinayak but it 
was stronger in Surya Vinayak. However, the case is opposite for the likelihood of being 
patient in Surya Vinayak. To worry had a strong negative relation with the existence of 
hyperbolic preferences in both samples and was particularly strong in Challing 
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Chart 8        Determinants of time preference                
   
Hyperbolism 
    
Patience 
   
 
Challing 
 
Surya Vinayak 
 
Challing 
  
Surya Vinayak 
 C -0.212 -0.783 -0.252 -1.126 -1.353 -2.016 0.164 -0.677 -0.985 -2.047 -2.337 -0.859 
S.E 0.558 0.835 1.118 0.501 0.593 0.807 0.665 0.887 1.084 0.665 0.788 1.130 
Sex 0.341 0.296 0.340 0.011 -0.098 -0.114 -0.348 -0.323 -0.058 0.252 -0.014 -0.229 
S.E 0.277 0.342 0.392 0.231 0.242 0.272 0.291 0.343 0.381 0.307 0.339 0.384 
Age -0.013 -0.016 -0.017 0.009 0.012 0.017 -0.008 -0.015 -0.013 0.012 -0.014 -0.014 
S.E 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.022 
Education -0.038 -0.007 -0.011 0.016 -0.002 0.020 0.031 0.003 -0.031 0.073* 0.076* 0.095** 
S.E 0.037 0.044 0.051 0.031 0.032 0.037 0.041 0.048 0.053 0.041 0.043 0.047 
Family size 
 
-0.001 0.033 
 
0.006 -0.033 
 
0.147* 0.143* 
 
0.136 0.142 
S.E 
 
0.070 0.076 
 
0.060 0.071 
 
0.077 0.079 
 
0.086 0.091 
Income 
 
0,000 0,000 
 
2.26E-05** 1.70E-05 
 
3.69E-06 3.24E-06 
 
7.41E-05** 7.56E-05** 
S.E 
 
1.42E-05 1.57E-05 
 
1.01E-05 1.13E-05 
 
1.28E-05 1.30E-05 
 
3.14E-05 3.33E-05 
Experience 
 
0.244 0.202 
 
0.045 0.174 
 
0.226 0.281 
 
-0.058 0.029 
S.E 
 
0.218 0.249 
 
0.152 0.172 
 
0.234 0.256 
 
0.225 0.246 
Importance 
of saving 
  
0.097 
  
0.678 
  
0.083 
  
-1.090 
S.E 
  
0.295 
  
0.305 
  
0.274 
  
0.712 
Worry 
  
-1.103*** 
  
-0.757*** 
  
0.551 
  
-0.669 
S.E 
  
0.345 
  
0.273 
  
0.500 
  
0.420 
Risk taking 
  
-0.106 
  
0.170 
  
-0.430 
  
-0.077 
S.E 
  
0.429 
  
0.353 
  
0.440 
  
0.524 
*Significant at ten percent, **significant at five percent, ***significant at one percent 
 
 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis 
To test the strength of my hypotheses and the robustness of my results I divide the sample into 
subsamples and try the hypothesis for each group in the same way as I did with the whole 
sample. I test for women, men, young and old people as a whole and depending on where they 
were from. The results are visible in table 2.2-2.5. 
For women, age had a positive effect on savings but decreased as I added more variables and 
became negative with very low significance when all variables were in the regression 
indicating that age then made up for the effect of other variables. In the end, the effect of age 
for women’s savings is unclear and for all men it is also unclear. For men in Challing, age had 
a negative effect on the savings and the opposite was the case in Surya Vinayak.For the young 
age is positively and for old age is negatively related to age indicating a non-linear 
relationship between age and savings. 
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For all men and women one more year of education resulted in respectively 131 and 59 more 
rupees saved per month but as I added more variables the effect shrunk and even became 
negative, but with very low significance. This suggests that education in the first regressions 
covered the effect of something else. In this case I believe it can be income or experience 
which both had positive correlation with savings. For both young and old education is 
negatively correlated with savings. The question remains this correlation is more or less true 
for all samples as education should be positive for savings.  
Concerning the family size, alla sub samples show the same tendencies except for the young. 
It was negative for everyone in Challing to have a large family while it was positive in Surya 
Vinayak. For the sample of young individuals, the case was the inverse.  
The samples did not differ much on the relation between income and savings. Women in 
Surya Vinayak were the only ones who stood out with a negative correlation. There is no 
evident explanation to why this is the case. One possibility is that when women finally earn 
larger amounts of money they change priorities and saving is not as important anymore while 
men are used to their income and increase savings with increased income.  
Experience turns out to be very important to the women and men in Surya Vinaya. In Challing 
on the other hand experience could turn out negative or insignificant at best. For the young the 
relationship was very positive in both locations while the older had an almost neutral 
relationship.  
Hyperbolism affected the people in Challing and Surya Vinayak differently. In Challing 
hyperbolic time preferences was related to smaller monthly saving while the hyperbolic in 
Surya Vinayak instead had higher savings. Men and women both follow this pattern, women 
to a larger extent than men. The young on the other hand had a negative relationship 
regardless of location while the old had a strong positive relation. The result from chapter 4.2 
may in this case be off target because of differences between age groups.  
Risk taking turned out to be negative for the savings of all subsamples in accordance with the 
whole sample. The largest negative effect of being a risk taker was for everyone living in 
Surya Vinayak.  
Worrying was very negative for all women regardless of where they lived. Women who 
worried saved almost 1000 rupees less than those who do not worry about losing their 
income. They also save a smaller proportion of their income. For the men in Challing who 
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worry about their income, their savings were affected very negatively whereas the effect 
slightly positive. For the young and old, worrying was consistently negative. 
Regarding considered importance, the OLS for the entire sample showed a positive 
correlation. Remember that importance was measured on an inverted scale so that a minus 
mark for the correlation means increasing importance. For men and women this was true and 
notably in Challing. But for the young the results were not so clear and for the old the 
correlation was negative.   
I can conclude that some of my OLS-results for the entire sample are not robust because of 
the large differences among the subgroups. The variables that show most difference between 
the subsamples are age, income, hyperbolic time preferences and stated importance.  
4.5 Discussion  
From the data I can draw some conclusions about the population’s preferences and the 
relation to savings. However, the differences between the subgroups that I looked into in my 
sensitivity analysis are large and contribute to the low robustness of the results for the entire 
sample or the samples of Surya Vinayak and Challing.  
The hyperbolic were over represented for the group that wanted to cut back on their expenses 
which proposes that they indeed had some self-control issues. But to draw any conclusions 
from my material is precarious as the quality is rather low. 
Other fallouts were surprising, for example that patient women in Challing save much less 
than other women in the village. Anomalies like that are difficult to explain but on the other 
hand the sub samples are so small that they cannot be considered significant and applicable to 
other groups of people.  
The difference between the sexes was striking but this can be contributed to the income 
differences. Men make more money and save more, about twice as much as women for both 
earnings and savings, but viewed as a proportion of their income they do not save more than 
women do. Furthermore, I have not controlled for differences between women and men such 
as education and role in the household which may in part explain the difference. In general, it 
is hard to say anything about the causality between the variables. For example, do those with 
higher income save more because they simply have more money? Or is it because they can 
afford to be forward-looking and plan ahead? Most likely it is a mixture of the two and of 
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other explanations. The individual can for example have higher earnings as a result of longer 
education which in itself made the individual aware of the importance of saving money. These 
types of questions are applicable to all of my results. If the results should be interpreted in 
order to improve savings product’s or estimate the need for formal savings products similar to 
those accessible in Surya Vinayak it is vital to critically assess the actual directions of 
causality.  
Having said that, there are some main points I can draw from my data especially concerning 
hyperbolic individuals. In my sample, hyperbolism is equally frequent in Challing and for the 
members of Chundevi Saccos. The link between hyperbolism and savings was opposite in the 
different areas which confirms theory that where financial products are available (as in Surya 
Vinayak) sophisticated people can overcome weaknesses and actually turn them into 
strengths. Similarly, patience does not necessarily lead to higher savings. This may be my 
most important result as in shines a light on the importance of savings products tailored for 
the poor and their needs. 
One legitimate question would be that if these limitations to the poor’s rationality in the shape 
of hyperbolic time preferences hinder them to save, should not savings just be mandatory for 
all members of MFI’s? At Chundevi Saccos this is the case and that is why I do not look at 
the presence of savings but rather the size. But as always, there is no quick-fix solution to the 
problem of low savings among the poor. In the case of Chundevi Saccos, the mandatory 
savings worked well, but it seems this is not the answer for all MFI’s. Most have to instead 
find other ways to encourage savings ( Banerjee & Duflo, 2011, s. 197) (Morduch & Aghion, 
2005, s. 149). Based on my results, the mere availability of savings products do a great deal 
for the poor.  
Additionally, understanding the variances between different costumers of the MFI’s can also 
be essential. Women turned out to be more inclined towards inconsistent time preference 
which would make them good candidates for commitment savings products for example. Risk 
aversion and earlier experience was positively correlated with savings and worry was 
negatively correlated. This type of information can be used to market and educate about 
savings among the poor and thus increase the usage of savings products. 
Some of my outcomes are in line with earlier findings and my hypothesis such as that 
hyperbolic members of Chundevi Saccos save more than hyperbolic in Challing. I can 
confirm the hypothesis that women are more positively affected by hyperbolic time 
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preferences than men with regard to savings. Behavior for time preference was not 
unequivocal as my hypothesis was not entirely confirmed. Patient people had larger savings 
than average if they were members of Chundevi Saccos but if they lived in Challing their 
savings were way below average and age had no specific effect. Education contributed a little 
to patience but the effect was mostly visible in Surya Vinayak.  
 
5. Summary  
I can conclude that personal preferences did play a role for the savings for people in Surya 
Vinayak and Challing and that the different preferences sometimes have endogenous 
explanations. The hypothesis I could accept or not are presented in the discussion. 
However, my study has limitations and the result is not detailed to the extent I would have 
liked it to be. My findings are not exhaustive and sometimes imprecise. To a large extent, I 
relate this to the use intervals for some of the data in the survey. Therefore, my results cannot 
be considered exact estimates, more like indications towards which direction the correlation 
lies.  
Behavioral economics like this have a large role to play for making financial products suitable 
for the poor. There is no one size fits all when it comes to finance and products that look like 
the ones in rich countries are not necessarily what the poor need. Nevertheless, the availability 
of financial products do a great deal for the process of poor people breaking poverty traps and 
escaping poverty.  
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Appendix: 
Table 1.1 Correlation All 
           
Kolumn1 Age Education Family  Income 
Income 
/person Exper  Import Trust Worry Hypbol Patience Risk Savings 
Savings/ 
income 
Sex 0,044 0,257 0,009 0,208 0,196 0,147 0,040 0,025 -0,098 0,045 0,005 -0,022 0,141 -0,050 
Age 
 
-0,512 0,102 -0,051 -0,093 0,167 0,164 -0,102 -0,077 0,010 -0,011 0,167 -0,012 0,016 
Education 
  
0,006 0,217 0,219 0,079 -0,098 0,119 0,075 -0,003 0,087 -0,304 0,127 0,006 
Family size 
   
-0,021 -0,158 0,005 0,099 -0,042 -0,056 0,031 0,185 0,065 0,045 -0,017 
Income 
    
0,625 0,170 -0,010 0,110 -0,079 0,133 0,061 -0,092 0,282 -0,014 
Income/person
 
0,164 -0,018 0,011 -0,044 0,171 0,054 -0,026 0,196 0,069 
Experience  
      
-0,058 -0,038 0,006 0,081 0,059 0,030 0,186 0,088 
Importance 
       
-0,040 0,005 0,096 0,082 0,103 -0,049 -0,138 
Trust 
        
-0,138 -0,028 -0,159 -0,044 0,022 0,115 
Worry 
         
-0,340 0,044 -0,149 -0,070 -0,138 
Hyperbolism 
          
- 0,043 0,054 0,046 
Patience 
           
0,114 0,044 -0,170 
Risk taker 
            
-0,254 -0,218 
Savings 
             
0,584 
 
Table 1. 2 Correlation Challing 
            
Kolumn1 Age Education 
Family 
size Income 
Income/ 
person Exp Imp Trust Worry Hypbol Patience Risk Savings 
Savings 
/income 
Sex 0,042 0,291 -0,022 0,254 0,237 0,237 0,074 0,118 -0,154 0,077 -0,133 -0,005 0,122 -0,014 
Age 
 
-0,586 0,082 -0,050 -0,201 0,031 0,179 -0,043 -0,135 -0,044 -0,165 0,082 -0,100 -0,090 
Education 
  
-0,023 0,242 0,325 0,066 -0,139 0,131 0,124 -0,024 0,147 -0,275 0,154 0,056 
Family size 
   
-0,109 0,026 -0,106 0,117 -0,016 -0,036 0,041 0,216 0,048 -0,184 -0,129 
Income 
    
0,726 0,111 -0,086 0,095 0,074 0,008 -0,004 -0,018 0,172 0,016 
Income per person 
   
0,019 -0,019 0,054 0,046 0,046 -0,094 0,003 0,145 0,100 
Experience  
      
-0,158 0,035 -0,066 0,111 0,081 0,084 0,184 0,122 
Importance 
       
0,061 0,037 0,061 0,071 0,128 -0,157 -0,113 
Trust 
        
-0,142 0,095 -0,059 0,106 0,044 0,015 
Worry 
         
-0,398 0,257 -0,116 -0,147 -0,191 
Hyperbolism 
          
- 0,070 0,045 0,109 
Patience 
           
-0,120 -0,104 -0,158 
Risk taker 
            
-0,097 -0,058 
Savings 
             
0,769 
 
Table 1.3 Correlation Surya Vinayak 
         
Kolumn1 Age Edu 
Family 
size Income 
Income 
/person Experience Importance Trust Worry Hypbol 
Patienc
e Risk Savings 
Saving 
/income 
Sex 0,031 0,261 0,034 0,199 0,198 0,098 -0,018 -0,054 -0,042 0,020 0,106 -0,174 0,216 -0,032 
Age 
 
-0,407 0,112 -0,022 -0,004 0,263 0,115 -0,132 0,012 0,055 0,037 0,081 0,102 0,206 
Education 
  
0,052 0,174 0,138 0,085 0,003 0,027 -0,008 0,019 0,147 -0,217 0,064 -0,150 
Family size 
   
0,047 -0,164 0,274 -0,003 -0,146 -0,212 0,065 -0,018 0,132 -0,106 0,084 
Income 
    
0,573 0,194 0,094 0,093 -0,203 0,215 0,237 -0,024 0,283 -0,132 
Income per person 
   
0,238 0,080 -0,063 0,048 0,147 -0,130 -0,099 0,097 0,073 
Experience  
      
0,024 -0,106 0,048 0,065 0,056 0,033 0,201 0,074 
Importance 
       
-0,166 -0,011 0,147 -0,018 -0,142 0,080 -0,078 
Trust 
        
-0,195 -0,163 -0,130 0,132 -0,146 -0,063 
Worry 
         
-0,284 -0,127 -0,094 -0,098 -0,197 
Hyperbolism 
          
- 0,015 0,097 0,084 
Patience 
           
-0,064 0,350 0,073 
Risk taker 
           
-0,098 0,103 
Savings 
             
0,507 
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Table 1.4 Correlation All Women 
          
Kolumn1 Edu 
Family 
size Income 
Income 
/person Exp Imp Trust Worry Hypbolism Patience Risk Savings 
Savings 
/income 
Age -0,635 0,042 -0,097 -0,107 0,217 0,237 -0,125 -0,198 0,139 0,011 0,191 0,047 0,100 
Education   -0,012 0,199 0,176 -0,051 -0,127 0,145 0,163 -0,154 0,045 -0,294 0,068 0,008 
Family size     -0,006 -0,060 -0,031 0,121 -0,065 -0,100 0,033 0,085 0,096 0,018 -0,055 
Income 
 
    0,572 0,303 0,003 0,386 -0,120 0,192 -0,115 0,021 0,303 0,003 
Income per person 
 
    0,299 -0,136 0,016 -0,024 -0,001 0,023 -0,060 0,213 -0,077 
Experience  
  
    -0,066 0,117 -0,044 0,118 0,003 0,138 0,296 0,135 
Importance 
   
    -0,118 0,031 0,172 0,023 0,033 -0,016 -0,108 
Trust 
     
    -0,104 0,045 -0,252 -0,012 0,118 0,154 
Worry 
      
    -0,383 0,115 -0,206 -0,192 -0,188 
Hyperbolism 
      
    - 0,063 0,101 -0,009 
Patience 
        
    0,091 -0,188 -0,317 
Risk taker 
        
    -0,202 -0,154 
Savings 
          
    0,706 
              
              
Tabel 1.5 Correlation Women  Challing 
        
Kolumn1 Edu Family Income 
Income 
/person Exp  Imp Trust Worry Hypbol Patience Risk Savings 
Savings 
/income 
Age -0,709 0,010 -0,191 -0,257 0,283 0,251 -0,019 -0,218 -0,006 -0,217 0,123 0,113 -0,005 
Education   0,039 0,344 0,329 -0,269 -0,197 0,010 0,236 -0,234 0,198 -0,285 -0,030 -0,081 
Family size     -0,131 -0,012 -0,100 0,135 -0,048 -0,173 0,099 0,015 -0,020 -0,129 -0,054 
Income 
 
    -0,012 -0,100 0,135 -0,048 -0,173 0,099 0,015 -0,020 -0,129 -0,054 
Income per person 
 
    0,063 -0,158 -0,162 0,117 -0,103 -0,221 -0,083 0,144 -0,003 
Experience  
  
    -0,175 0,136 -0,080 0,225 -0,075 0,273 0,177 0,213 
Importance 
   
    -0,047 0,060 0,090 0,045 0,087 -0,129 -0,151 
Trust 
     
    -0,088 0,249 -0,077 0,238 0,012 -0,081 
Worry 
      
    -0,548 0,204 -0,171 -0,177 -0,162 
Hyperbolism 
      
    - 0,273 0,085 0,194 
Patience 
        
    -0,220 -0,211 -0,087 
Risk taker 
        
    -0,029 0,092 
Savings 
          
    0,725 
              
Table 1.6 Correlation Women Chundevi Saccos 
        
Kolumn1 Edu 
Family 
size Income 
Income 
/person Exp Imp Trust Worry Hypbol Patience Risk Savings 
Savings 
/income 
Age -0,556 0,055 0,000 0,056 0,205 0,218 -0,185 -0,175 0,255 0,071 0,108 0,115 0,271 
Education   -0,029 0,068 0,050 0,025 -0,035 0,176 0,097 -0,115 0,027 -0,151 -0,020 -0,142 
Family size     0,083 -0,085 0,014 0,094 -0,033 -0,028 -0,014 0,101 0,100 0,146 0,031 
Income 
 
    0,657 0,440 -0,125 0,172 -0,244 0,006 0,232 0,183 0,131 -0,266 
Income per person 
 
    0,392 -0,118 0,125 -0,126 0,054 0,294 0,057 0,192 -0,208 
Experience  
  
    0,000 0,080 -0,026 0,072 0,123 0,190 0,323 0,080 
Importance 
   
    -0,203 0,005 0,263 -0,133 -0,144 0,136 -0,022 
Trust 
     
    -0,105 0,039 -0,045 0,111 -0,025 0,039 
Worry 
      
    -0,274 0,057 -0,243 -0,260 -0,255 
Hyperbolism 
      
    - -0,019 0,140 -0,042 
Patience 
        
    -0,091 0,050 -0,199 
Risk taker 
        
    0,007 0,106 
Savings 
          
    0,634 
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Table 1.7 Correlation All Men 
         
Kolumn1 Edu Family Income 
Income 
/person Exp  Imp Trust Worry Hypbol Patience Risk Savings 
Savings 
/income 
Age -0,439 0,161 -0,054 -0,114 0,111 0,095 -0,080 0,038 -0,114 -0,035 0,148 -0,043 -0,057 
Education   0,023 0,196 0,202 0,162 -0,096 0,080 0,043 0,141 0,138 -0,326 0,131 0,030 
Family size     -0,030 -0,230 0,043 0,078 -0,015 -0,016 0,029 0,288 0,035 0,064 0,023 
Income 
 
    0,621 0,074 0,016 0,087 -0,042 0,177 0,140 -0,101 0,256 -0,006 
Income 
/person 
 
    0,067 0,026 -0,002 -0,026 0,256 0,080 -0,004 0,165 0,169 
Experience  
   
    -0,053 -0,219 0,074 0,035 0,111 -0,077 0,127 0,057 
Importance 
    
    0,043 -0,010 0,024 0,132 0,172 -0,081 -0,161 
Trust 
     
    -0,171 -0,108 -0,049 -0,080 -0,026 0,074 
Worry 
      
    -0,296 -0,015 -0,100 0,000 -0,106 
Hyperbolism 
      
    - 0,024 0,027 0,107 
Patience 
        
    0,138 0,169 -0,001 
Risk taker 
        
    -0,307 -0,288 
Savings 
          
    0,626 
              
              
Table 1.8 Correlation Men Chundevi Saccos 
        
Kolumn1 Edu Family Income 
Income 
/person Exp Imp Trust Worry Hypbol Patience Risk Savings 
Savings 
/income 
Age -0,250 0,174 -0,044 -0,038 0,332 -0,018 -0,074 0,216 -0,178 -0,027 0,062 0,125 0,136 
Education   0,147 0,196 0,137 0,119 0,078 -0,125 -0,124 0,200 0,255 -0,253 0,041 -0,155 
Family size     0,031 -0,235 0,144 0,026 -0,063 -0,103 0,060 0,124 -0,110 0,212 0,193 
Income 
 
    0,538 0,092 0,232 0,093 -0,203 0,331 0,214 -0,096 0,272 -0,092 
Income per person 
 
    0,151 0,077 -0,137 -0,117 0,388 0,213 0,131 0,170 0,145 
Experience  
   
    0,066 -0,274 0,139 0,057 -0,025 -0,193 0,153 0,072 
Importance 
    
    -0,133 -0,033 -0,006 0,068 -0,144 0,066 -0,150 
Trust 
     
    -0,222 -0,142 -0,069 0,102 -0,161 -0,120 
Worry 
      
    -0,310 -0,271 0,099 -0,036 -0,175 
Hyperbolism 
      
    - 0,074 0,087 0,210 
Patience 
        
    0,021 0,501 0,375 
Risk taker 
        
    -0,122 0,088 
Savings 
          
    0,559 
              
              
              
Table 1.9 Correlation Men Challing 
         
Kolumn1 Edu Family Income 
Income 
/person Exp  Imp Trust Worry Hypbol Patience Risk Savings 
Savings 
/income 
Age -0,551 0,149 -0,035 -0,182 
-
0,182 -0,166 0,124 -0,069 -0,071 -0,075 -0,099 0,051 -0,229 
Education   -0,077 0,167 0,265 0,234 -0,150 0,204 0,135 0,111 0,123 -0,287 0,235 0,201 
Family size     -0,117 -0,230 
-
0,094 0,109 0,032 0,077 -0,002 0,433 0,110 -0,223 -0,200 
Income 
 
    0,780 0,043 -0,124 0,063 0,143 -0,032 0,114 0,028 0,087 -0,029 
Income per person 
 
    
-
0,076 0,017 0,139 0,066 0,087 0,000 0,041 0,118 0,160 
Experience  
   
    -0,174 -0,150 -0,009 0,002 0,261 -0,056 0,153 0,067 
Importance 
    
    0,151 0,044 0,030 0,119 0,160 -0,192 -0,080 
Trust 
     
    -0,167 -0,071 0,008 -0,036 0,043 0,126 
Worry 
      
    -0,276 0,278 -0,069 -0,109 -0,226 
Hyperbolism 
      
    - -0,089 0,011 0,045 
Patience 
        
    0,006 -0,025 -0,206 
Risk taker 
        
    -0,145 -0,188 
Savings 
          
    0,813 
   
Table 2.1: Full sample 
               
 
Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All 
C 502 -239 206 741 -1691 -678 2529** -1019 1109 0.09* 0.164 0.139** 0.098 0.101 0.119 0.22** 0.31* 0.346*** 
 
529 1386 949 804 2051 1294 1035 2481 1506 0.05 0.113 0.068 0.070 0.127 0.085 0.091 0.162 0.096 
Sex  226 1516** 653 97.4 1221** 5189 15.2 1245** 609 -0.003 -0.006 -0.028 -0.012 0.0055 -0.0255 -0.028 0.0122 -0.022 
S.E 249 650 398 334 604 390 366 597 411 0.022 0.053 0.032 0.030 0.0541 0.0359 0.032 0.0548 0.035 
Age -6.5 47.5 13.1 -6.16 21 2.2 -11.4 7.6 -38 -0.001 0.004* 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0037 0.0011 -0.0009 0.0021 0.0004 
S.E 11.6 32.2 19.3 14.9 29.2 18.9 15.6 32.7 19.8 0.001 0.003 0.0015 0.0013 0.0029 0.0018 0.001 0.0029 0.002 
Education 16.8 65.8 85.4 14.1 -3.3 19.4 1.95 -37.0 -39.8 0.0002 -0.006 0.002 0.0002 -0.0054 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0081 -0.005 
S.E 34.3 85.2 65.9 43.2 94.2 61.8 47.95 107 70.2 0.0030 0.007 0.0042 0.0038 0.0071 0.0047 0.004 0.0072 0.005 
Family size - - - -90.1 267.8 109.9 -68 273 122 - - - -0.0066 0.0117 -0.001 -0.005 0.004 -0.001 
S.E - - - 69.0 192.5 116.2 73 221 122 - - - 0.0059 0.0147 0.009 0.006 0.015 0.008 
Income - - - 0.014 0.06 0.056 0.02 0.06 0.05 - - - -4.21E-07 -2.27E-06 
-8.16E-
07 -9.87E-08 -2.40E-06 
-1.09E-
06 
S.E - - - 0.015 0.06 0.048 0.014 0.07 0.048 - - - 1.24E-06 1.86E-06 1.34E-06 1.26E-06 1.92E-06 1.27E-06 
Experience - - -  222 526 510* 124 686 610** - - - 0.022 0.020 0.031 0.011 0.033 0.030 
S.E - - - 220 437 282 237 511 309 - - - 0.020 0.034 0.023 0.021 0.035 0.023 
Hyper- 
bolism - - -   - - -123 226 93 - - - - - - 0.011 0.041 0.021 
S.E - - -   - - 417 937 618 - - - - - - 0.036 0.071 0.044 
Risk taking - - -   - - -486 -759 -1617*** - - - - - - -0.0182 0.0363 -0.10*** 
S.E - - -   - - 399 522 380 - - - - - - 0.0342 0.0728 0.035 
Importance - - -   - - -212 .12397 -198 - - - - - - -0.007 -0.073 -0.06* 
S.E - - -   - - 263 1177 418 - - - - - - 0.023 0.073 0.033 
Worry - - -   - - -1079*** -286 -745 - - - - - - -0.10*** -0.0887 -0.096** 
S.E - - -   - - 384 1114 645 - - - - - - 0.034 0.061 0.039 
R2 
-
0.0016 0.0406 0.0186 0.0053 0.1110 0.0799 0.0769 0.0900 0.1259 -0.0181 0.0231 -0.0093 -0.0335 0.0185 -0.0123 0.0540 0.0257 0.0629 
F-statistic 0.9371 2.8927 2.6261 1.0823 3.7257 4.2543 1.7001 2.2072 3.9819 0.3132 1.8820 0.2981 0.5191 1.3488 0.5932 1.4567 1.2721 2.2354 
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Table 2.2: Women   
                
 
Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All 
X-variables Savings in absolut numbers 
    
  
        
C -276 734 71 -349 -500 -567 791 1603 1189 0.115 0.079 0.0407 0.106 0.052 0.032 0.157 0.422 0.33** 
 
668 1017 697 836 1194 857 1190 1764 971 0.072 0.145 0.101 0.109 0.169 0.124 0.163 0.258 0.145 
Age 15 25 21 19 9,4 14 15 -32 -6 -0.001 0.0064 0.0032 -0.0016 0.0056 0.0039 -0.00035 0.0026 0.001130 
S.E 15 24 16 17 25 18 23 23 18 0.002 0.0038 0.0026 0.0023 0.0037 0.0027 0.0031 0.00516 0.0029 
Education 22 23 59 -37 0.31 26 -17 -44 -2 -0.0037 -0.0022 0.0049 -0.0070 -0.0013 0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0025 9.40E-05 
S.E 41 59 41 45 60 43 57 58 45 0.0043 0.00807 0.0056 0.00578 0.0086 0.0063 0.0074 0.00737 0.0067 
Number of people in household   -31 126 22 -42 61 -13       -0.00019 0.0044 -0.0081 -0.0026 -0.0083 -0.0082 
S.E       63 115 75 72 138 73       0.0080 0.0183 0.0112 0.0094 0.0240 0.012 
Income       0.18*** -0.0018 0.061** 0.197*** -0.038 0.035       6.80E-06 -1.33E-05** -3.97E-06 7.55E-06 -2.00E-05*** 
-7.49E-
06 
S.E       0.04 0.039 0.030 0.045 0.049 0.045       5.13E-06 5.57E-06 4.37E-06 5.94E-06 4.76E-06 4.56E-06 
Experience       -46 713** 463** -195 10935*** 664**       0.0256 0.065 0.046 -0.0134 0.123** 0.065* 
S.E       238 307 227 289 367 266       0.0321 0.046 0.035 0.0406 0.0520 0.037 
Hyperbolism             -239 633 465             0.074 -0.076 -0.0046 
S.E             710 667 553             0.095 0.086 0.0713 
Risk taking             310 -420 -741**             0.039 0.050 -0.059 
S.E             412 461 314             0.055 0.087 0.0504 
Importance             -150 234 -29             -0.029 -0.109 -0.068 
S.E             294 996 360             0.0386 0.0682 0.048 
Worry             -1016* -1233** -880*             -0.051 -0.194** -0.13** 
S.E             567 589 474             0.080 0.0963 0.065 
Adjusted R2 -0.0165 -0.0121 0.0041 0.3079 0.0543 0.0872 0.3572 0.1328 0.1620 -0.0231 0.0430 -0.0008 -0.0153 0.0949 0.0059 -0.01379 0.1717 0.0423 
F-test 0.5223 0.5592 1.1110 4.9146 1.8149 3.2153 3.3459 2.0889 3.2131 0.3684 2.3696 0.9522 0.8732 2.2580 1.1227 0.9456 2.2442 1.4469 
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Table 2.3: Men   
                
 
Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All 
X-variables Savings in absolut numbers 
     
  
        
C 1061 304 756 1614 -1382 -335 4123** -715 2080 0.046 0.242 0.183* 0.0998 0.143 0.149 0.258* 0.288 0.350** 
S.E 867 2840 1582 1338 3997 2472 1769 5226 2908 0.071 0.177 0.103 0.1031 0.195 0.125 0.136 0.266 0.148 
Age -19 68 6 -19 19 -10 -26 3.8 -10 -0.00039 0.0026 -0.0010 1.11E-05 -1.89E-05 -0.0011 -0.000764 0.0013 -0.00012 
S.E 17 63 32 22 53 29 22 59 29 0.0013 0.0040 0.00204 0.00166 0.0047 0.0024 0.001685 0.0050 0.002171 
Education 34 108 131 43 -50 11 -1.39 -87 -73 0.0045 -0.0093 3.39E-05 0.0059 -0.0115 -0.0034 0.00168 -0.0154 -0.0108 
S.E 54 187 100 71 208 122 78 238 128 0.0043 0.0112 0.0063 0.0055 0.0121 0.0074 0.00598 0.0120 0.0091 
Familysize    *-120 484 225 -79 566 239       -0.0122 0.0308 0.0082 -0.0069 0.0225 0.00607 
S.E       118 411 242 126 490 245       0.0088 0.024 0.0131 0.00928 0.0244 0.0115 
Income       0.0042 0.071 0.056 0.0083 0.071 0.052       -1.08E-06 -1.03E-06 -4.18E-07 -4.70E-07 -1.40E-06 -6.44E-07 
S.E       0.0176 0.072 0.053 0.0183 0.078 0.052       1.32E-06 2.15E-06 1.46E-06 1.35E-06 2.42E-06 1.07E-06 
Experience      69 554 522 -57 506 471       0.0042 0.025 0.0221 0.00071 0.0173 0.0149 
S.E       354 838 495 368 946 510       0.0270 0.058 0.034 0.0278 0.058 0.040261 
Hyperbolism            -296 -9.3 -152             -0.0244 0.126 0.0339 
S.E             586 1784 965             0.0437 0.115 0.0725 
Risk taking          -876 -1600 -2430***             -0.0646 0.0089 -0.1426** 
S.E             658 1419 718             0.0488 0.163 0.0479 
Importance            -3945 -273 -223             -0.00041 -0.083 -0.0382 
S.E             417 2415 722             0.03112 0.132 0.0381 
Worry             -1064* 438 -604             -0.1067** -0.0610 -0.0902 
S.E             550 2082 973             0.0420 0.0970 0.0577 
Adjusted 
R2 0.0273 -0.0130 
-
0.00039 -0.0209 0.0470 0.0361 0.0259 -0.0231 0.0780 0.0081 -0.0078 -0.0152 -0.0298 -0.0303 -0.0428 0.0478 -0.0485 0.0512 
F-statistic 1.8712 0.6203 0.9765 0.8039 1.5822 1.8086 1.1327 0.8569 1.9687 1.2397 0.8057 0.1772 0.7341 0.7062 0.2034 1.2398 0.7531 1.5512 
 
 
41 
 
Table 2.4: Young   
                
 
Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All 
X-variables Savings in absolut numbers 
              
C -1451 -2301 -1850 -3778 -1874 -2410 -2523 -3126 -2344 0.0549 0.094 0.063 0.085 0.0201 0.035 0.077 0.1410 0.174 
 
1700 1849 1312 2951 2097 1708 3188 4006 2266 0.1407 0.257 0.165 0.173 0.2803 0.196 0.284 0.3113 0.232 
Sex 802* 949 904 690 780 708 864 903 946 0.0110 0.0402 0.039 -0.0120 0.0554 0.0409 -0.0065 0.0109 0.023 
S.E 417 865 568 590 754 605 609 918 723 0.0355 0.0650 0.041 0.028 0.0677 0.0470 0.0592 0.0700 0.049 
Age 68 197** 133** 140 135 139* 198** 141 173* -0.0012 0.0076 0.004 -0.0033 0.0076 0.0051 0.0020 0.0088 0.007 
S.E 668 95 62 99 118 78 96 142 87 0.0055 0.0103 0.007 0.0069 0.0112 0.007 0.0090 0.0108 0.0072 
Education 9 -102 -44 -9 -128 -68 23 -159 -104 0.0042 -0.00990 -0.004 0.0060** -0.0085 -0.003 0.0087 -0.0151* -0.008 
S.E 57 154 94 71 158 109 78 122 122 0.0047 0.0089 0.006 0.0029 0.0091 0.0061 0.0071 0.0089 0.007 
Family Size       -29 -81 -84 79 -80 -67       -0.0020 0.00092 -0.0043 0.0054 -0.0168 -0.008 
S.E       121 227 138 125 236 137       0.0051 0.0183 0.011 0.0111 0.0193 0.010 
Income       0.075* 0.004 0.018 0.087** 0.0079 0.017       6.35E-07 -2.33E-06 -1.17E-06 1.55E-06 -2.13E-06 -1.25E-06 
S.E       0.039 0.025 0.026 0.037 0.0309 0.030       2.38E-06 1.96E-06 1.57E-06 3.27E-06 2.15E-06 1.14E-06 
Experience       448 1075 704 363 1511** 924*       0.023 0.04489 0.0255 0.0218 0.0676 0.037 
S.E       422 713 466 408 651 495       0.0317 0.0491 0.0313 0.0367 0.0507 0.0365 
Hyperbolism             -1810** -1647 -1220*             -0.085 -0.1131 -0.092 
S.E             679 1273 704             0.0667 0.09418 0.061 
Risk taking             -429 -1546 -1238**             0.0017 -0.0987 -0.095** 
S.E             612 1256 510             0.0546 0.1020 0.043 
Importance           -605 1003 50             -0.033 0.0663 -0.0048 
S.E             480 1309 720             0.0425 0.0964 0.051 
Worry             -2533*** 33 -527             -0.152* -0.1030 -0.107* 
S.E             716 1115 753             0.069 0.0837 0.064 
R2 0.0204 0.0244 0.0246 0.0641 0.0363 0.0471 0.2867 0.0520 0.0873 -0.0359 -0.0149 -0.0140 -0.0990 -0.0296 -0.0332 -0.0807 -0.0135 0.0382 
F-test 1.3743 1.5841 2.0510 1.4794 1.4268 1.9134 2.4871 1.3513 1.9752 0.4341 0.7117 0.4981 0.3994 0.7225 0.4691 0.7386 0.9283 1.3572 
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Table 2.5: Old     
               
 
Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All Challing 
Surya 
Vinayak All 
X-variables 
 
Savings in absolut numbers 
     
Savings as proportion of income 
     C 561 5893* 3262*** 736 3176 1910 1986 3668 4248*** 0.151* 0.2963 0.239* 0.1567 0.306 0.2276 0.3042** 0.6485** 0.5264*** 
S.E 803 3237 1207 1079 2639 1209 1281 2799 1475 0.081 0.2842 0.142 0.113 0.292 0.1704 0.1279 0.307 0.1758 
Sex -317 2160** 332 -525 1294 277 -476 1982** 769 -0.0089 -0.0567 -0.095* -0.0108 -0.0491 -0.0898 -0.0092 0.0314 -0.0204 
S.E 320 1041 4627 457 836 545 481 849 509 0.0333 0.09044 0.0503 0.0483 0.0938 0.0597 0.0486 0.0909 0.0587 
Age -4 -110 -58** 5 -116* -71** -2.87 -176*** -102*** -0.0018 0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0011 -0.0026 -0.0089 -0.0051 
S.E 17 72 27 24 60 34 25 61 36 0.0018 0.0064 0.0031 0.0026 0.0069 0.0039 0.00257 0.0067 0.0038 
Education 60 147 191** 70 15 69 49 -18 -20 -0.0017 -0.0011 0.0092 -0.0032 -0.0004 0.0048 -0.0042 -0.0012 -0.0035 
S.E 43 129 79 59 109 71 62 115 63 0.0044 0.012 0.0062 0.0061 0.0117 0.0076 0.0061 0.0117 0.0077 
Family Size       -124 535** 302* -106 531** 321*       -0.0083 0.0378 0.00304 -0.0052 0.0343 0.0095 
S.E       83 209 173 87 221 176       0.00865 0.0257 0.0135 0.0087 0.0255 0.0131 
Income       0.0043 0.209*** 0.094 0.0065 0.195*** 0.086       -5.37E-07 -4.28E-06 -8.15E-07 -1.73E-07 -6.57E-06 -1.92E-06 
S.E       0.0144 0.0402 0.095 0.0147 0.040 0.081       1.48E-06 4.37E-06 2.35E-06 1.44E-06 4.15E-06 2.21E-06 
Experience       141 -395 85 50 -102 130       0.026 -0.0182 0.018 -0.00017 0.0356 0.0157 
S.E       267 462 377 305 465 383       0.0288 0.0517 0.0354 0.0320 0.0509 0.0345 
Hyperbolism             657 1953 1808**             0.0826 0.1787 0.1418** 
S.E             528 1036 879             0.0524 0.1099 0.0682 
Risk taking             -502 281 -17485***             -0.0121 0.1496 -0.0689 
S.E             498 1056 490             0.0490 0.10843 0.0533 
Importance             -39 1573 223             0.0012 -0.1542 -0.0735 
S.E             289 946 397             0.0284 0.1158 0.0461 
Worry             -652 -1287 -1186*             -0.0983 -0.1127 -0.0869 
S.E             413 863 704             0.0417 0.0954 0.0584 
Adjusted R2 0.0019 0.1353 0.108 -0.0332 0.4696 0.2009 0.0350 0.3266 0.3266 -0.0209 -0.0410 0.0259 -0.0655 -0.0567 -0.0246 0.0974 0.0862 0.0863 
F-statistic 1.0428 4.2857 6.3049 0.7321 10.1479 5.7341 1.1669 6.0434 6.0434 0.5491 0.1748 2.0531 0.5079 0.5351 0.5951 1.4749 1.8780 1.8780 
 
